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Supreme Court Monitoring of the United States
Courts of Appeals En Banc
Tracey E. George* & Michael E. Solimine**

The modern Supreme Court agrees to hear only a handful of
cases each term. The Rehnquist Court has granted certiorari
to less than four percent of petitions, accountingfor less than
one percent of all cases decided by courts of appeals. Some
Court observers have hypothesized that the Court is more
likely to review cases decided by courts of appeals en banc.
They argue that, because legal issues heard en banc pose
closer and more salient questions, these cases are more likely
to be reviewed by the Supreme Court. The mere fact of en
banc considerationis notable because all circuits combined
sit en banc in only 80 or 90 cases a year. But other Court observers have proffered that the Supreme Court will be less
likely to review a decision in which all judges of a circuit
have participatedbecause the legal issues have been more
fully argued and exhaustively considered.
This article considers systematically whether the Supreme
Court is more likely to review an en banc court of appeals de* Associate Professor of Law and Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science,
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cision than a panel decision. First, we consider Supreme
Court review of en banc cases during the Rehnquist Court.
Then, in a multivariate empirical analysis of a three-circuit
subset of those cases, we control for other variables found to
influence the Court's certioraridecision, such as Solicitor
General or amicus curiae support for the certioraripetition, a
dissent from the court of appeal's opinion, an outcome contrary to the Court's ideological composition, and an intercircuit conflict. The discussion is situated in a larger context of
how legal scholars and political scientists have addressedthe
Rehnquist Court's shrunken caseloadfrom both empirical
and policy perspectives.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the October 1999 term, the United States Supreme Court continued its decade-long trend of deciding fewer than 100 fully argued
cases. The Court decided on the merits 79 cases in 74 opinions, representing less than four percent of paid petitions and approximately
one percent of all petitions.' In two instances, the Court reviewed
decisions issued after consideration by the entire court of appeals,
that is "en banc," rather than by the standard three-judge panel. 2 By
comparison, less than one-half of one percent of circuit opinions
3
were decided en banc during the previous year.
On the decade-long trend, see Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the
Rehnquist Court, 1996 S Ct Rev 403. For data on the 1999 Term, see Supreme Court
of the United States, 2000 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary,http://www.
supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2000year-endreport.html (visited April 2,
2001) (reporting that 2,092 paid petitions were filed with the Court in the 1999 term
as well as 5,282 in forma pauperis petitions and that the Court heard arguments in
83 cases, disposing of 79 cases in 74 signed opinions). In the prior term, the Court
disposed of 84 cases in 75 opinions. Id.
2 The two cases were United States v Morrison, 529 US 598 (2000), aff'g Brzonkala v Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State Univ, 169 F3d 820 (4th Cir 1999) (en
banc); and Hartford Underwriters Ins Co v Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 US 1
(2000), aff'g In re Hen House Interstate,Inc, 177 F3d 719 (8th Cir 1999) (en banc).
During the 1999 Term the Court also granted certiorari in three other en banc cases,
but did not reach the merits during the Term. See Hope Clinic v Ryan, 195 F3d 857
(7th Cir 1999) (en banc), cert granted and remanded for reconsideration, 120 S Ct
2738 (2000); Alsbrook v City of Maumelle, 184 F3d 999 (8th Cir 1999) (en banc), cert
granted in part, Alsbrook v Arkansas, 528 US 1146 (2000), cert dismissed, 529 US
1001 (2000); Atwater v City of Lago Vista, 195 F3d 242 (5th Cir 1999) (en banc), cert
granted, 120 S Ct 2715 (2000) (scheduled for argument in 2000 Term).
I See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, JudicialBusiness of the United
States Courts: 1999 Annual Report of the DirectorTable S-1 (1999), also available at
<http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus1999/contents.html> (visited April 2, 2001).
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That these decisions by the Supreme Court and en banc decisions
by the Courts of Appeals are comparatively rare events increases
rather than diminishes their significance. In both contexts, courts
place cases on their dockets by discretionary action, thereby setting
their own agendas and departing from the passivity that typifies
most judicial tribunals. And in both contexts, courts are declaring
law in a particularly authoritative manner.
Scholars have examined closely the gatekeeping function of the
Supreme Court's discretionary jurisdiction, seeking to explain the
certiorari decisions of the Court and the votes of individual justices,
as well as the effects of the Court's case-selection power.4 To a lesser
extent, researchers also have focused attention on the en banc process.' The interaction between the two phenomena has received comparatively little attention. This article considers that interaction.
The article proceeds as follows. Part II describes the Supreme
Court's certiorari process and the considerable literature that has
developed to explain the justices' case selection. Part II then considers the literature analyzing en banc decisionmaking by the U.S.
Courts of Appeals. Various commentators suggest both that en banc
decisions are less likely and that they are more likely to be reviewed
by the Supreme Court. Part II concludes with a review of recent
scholarship that explores the relationship between en banc decisions and Supreme Court review.
The balance of the article expands upon that literature. Part III
describes data on en banc decisions by the 12 general jurisdiction
circuit courts during the Rehnquist Court from the 1986 through
1999 Terms. In Part IV we address how often litigants sought Supreme Court review of such cases and how successful they were. To
attempt to gain a richer understanding of such litigant and Supreme
Court behavior, we describe and analyze our database of en banc
decisions of three circuits during the relevant time period that we
coded for a variety of possible explanatory variables. We conclude
the article by suggesting avenues for further research.
4 See, for example, Samuel Estreicher and John Sexton, Redefining the Supreme
Court's Role: A Theory of Managing the FederalJudicialProcess (Yale U, 1986) ("Estreicher and Sexton, Redefining the Supreme Court's Role"); Richard L. Pacelle, Jr.,
The Transformation of the Supreme Court's Agenda from the New Deal to the
Reagan Administration (Westview, 1991) ("Pacelle, Supreme Court's Agenda"); Lawrence A. Baum, Policy Goals in JudicialGate-Keeping:A Proximity Model of Discretionary Jurisdiction, 21 Am J Pol Sci 31 (1977); Gerhard Casper and Richard A.
Posner, A Study of the Supreme Court's Caseload, 3 J Legal Stud 339, 362-68 (1974).
See sources cited in notes 7-11, 50-51, 53, and 59-64.
s See sources cited in notes 21-27.
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II. DISCRETIONARY REVIEW BY THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE COURTS
OF APPEALS
A. Supreme Court and the Writ of Certiorari
Since the Judiciary Act of 1925, the Supreme Court has had nearly
complete discretionary authority over its docket, selecting most
cases that come before it through the writ of certiorari. Over the last
several decades, the Court has granted full review to less than onetenth of the certiorari petitions filed. The Court rarely states why it
is granting review either at the time of doing so or in its subsequent
opinion on the merits. It is still rarer for the Court or an individual
justice to state why a case is not being reviewed. The Court's rules
of procedure shed little light on potential reasons for review. They
simply state that "important" questions of federal law will be susceptible to review, including but not limited to a conflict between
6
decisions of the U.S. Courts of Appeals on an issue of federal law.
The importance of this agenda-setting function, coupled with the
paucity of official explanations for why particular cases are reviewed
and others are not, has drawn the attention of social scientists. Since
as early as the 1950s, students of the Court have examined its certiorari policy and practice.' Most of the early studies sought to identify
common characteristics of lower court decisions where certiorari
was sought that made it more likely the Court would grant review.
These included whether the federal government had sought review,
whether there was a dissent in the case below or a conflict among
decisions on the legal question presented, and the ideological direction of the decision below. More recent studies found other explanatory cues, such as whether and to what extent amicus curiae filed
briefs in support of the certiorari petition. Still other researchers,
drawing in part on the papers of retired justices or on interviews of
justices and their law clerks, have examined whether the justices
engaged in strategic voting on certiorari petitions (that is, how the
latter decision relates to the eventual decision on the merits). In
6

For a history of the Supreme Court's certiorari policy and relevant statistics, see

Richard H. Fallon, Daniel J. Meltzer and David L. Shapiro, Hart & Wechsler's The
FederalCourts and The Federal System 1691-1714 (Foundation, 4th ed 1996).
7 In his comprehensive review of literature, H. W Perry identifies the work of
Glendon Shubert in the late 1950s, and that of Joseph Tanenhaus and his associates
in the early 1960s, as the first to systematically study the certiorari process. H. W
Perry, Agenda Setting and Case Selection, in John B. Gates and Charles A. Johnson,
eds, The American Courts:A CriticalAssessment 235, 237 (CQ Press, 1991) ("Perry,
Agenda Setting").
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short, the literature suggests that a complex interplay of internal
norms among the justices and characteristics of the cases where re8
view is sought drives the certiorari process.
The most recent theme in the literature has been to situate the
certiorari process in a richer institutional context. Since the Supreme Court is formally at the apex of the judicial pyramid, the
Court can be conceived as a principal directing (or attempting to
direct) its agents, the lower courts. 9 In this model, justices, seeking
(among other things) to advance their own policy preferences, will
utilize certiorari review and reversal of divergent opinions to monitor how Courts of Appeal apply Supreme Court doctrine.' 0 The cases
that the Court places on its docket through the certiorari process
also may reflect the societal forces that generate litigation and the
justices' perception of the societal importance of certain issues."
Scholars have not paid much attention to the Court's relatively
recent and drastic reduction in its caseload. It has been suggested,
using the principal-agent model, that the relatively conservative
Rehnquist Court majority has found it less necessary to review (and
reverse) more conservative decisions by the Courts of Appeals.' 2 It
has also been argued that the decline in caseload, irrespective (to a
degree) of the cases actually reviewed, is best explained as a manifestation of the desire of a majority to the Court to reduce its role in
3
the American legal system.
8 In our very brief review we do not claim to do justice to the now burgeoning literature. For excellent summaries and evaluations of the literature, by contributors to
it, see in particular Lawrence Baum, The Puzzle of JudicialBehavior 78-83 (U Michigan, 1997); H. W Perry Jr., Deciding to Decide: Agenda Setting in the United States
Supreme Court (Harvard U, 1991) ("Perry, Deciding to Decide"); Lawrence Baum,
Case Selection and Decision-Making in the U.S. Supreme Court, 27 L & Socy Rev
443 (1993); Perry, Agenda Setting, at 235-53 (cited in note 7).
9 See Donald R. Songer, Jeffrey A. Segal and Charles M. Cameron, The Hierarchy
of Justice: Testing a Principal-AgentModel of Supreme Court-CircuitCourt Interactions, 38 Am J Pol Sci 673 (1994). See generally Matt Spitzer and Eric Talley, Judicial Auditing, 29 J Legal Stud 649 (2000).
1" See Charles M. Cameron, Jeffrey A. Segal and Donald Songer, Strategic
Auditing in a Political Hierarchy:An InformationalModel of the Supreme Court's
CertiorariDecisions, 94 Am Pol Sci Rev 101 (2000) (developing and testing a strategic model of Supreme Court certiorari decisions where the Court responds to signals
and indices from courts of appeals, termed a "judicial signaling game," and finding
that the Supreme Court was more likely to review liberal decisions by liberal courts).
" See Pacelle, Supreme Court'sAgenda, at 23-34 (cited in note 4); Charles R. Epp,
External Pressure and the Supreme Court's Agenda, in Cornell W Clayton and Howard Gillman, eds, Supreme Court Decision-Making: New Institutionalist Approaches 255-79 (U Chicago, 1999).
12Frank B. Cross, The Justices of Strategy, 48 Duke L J 511, 557-61 (1998).
"3See the perceptive analysis in Hellman, 1996 S Ct Rev 403 (cited in note 1).
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B. En Banc Review in the Courts of Appeals
At their inception in 1891, U.S. Courts of Appeals (then known as
circuit courts of appeals), each of which had three or fewer circuit
judges, continued the circuit courts' tradition of deciding cases with
three-judge panels. Responding to increasing appellate caseloads,
Congress gradually expanded the number of authorized full-time,
federal appellate judgeships to 179, ranging from six in the First Circuit to 28 in the Ninth Circuit. 4 The Supreme Court held that the
entire circuit had the inherent authority to sit as a whole (i.e., "en
banc") to decide cases, and Congress codified that holding shortly
thereafter, in 1946.15 Despite the en banc option, almost all cases
continue to be decided by three-judge panels.
For the first two decades following the recognition of the en banc
procedure, the circuits decided relatively few cases en banc. However, since that time, the number of cases heard en banc by the federal courts of appeals of general jurisdiction has increased fairly
steadily as illustrated in Figure 1.16 This figure is based on data from
14As of March 2001, the authorized judgeships per circuit were as follows:

Circuits

Number of Judges
District of Columbia
12
First
6
Second
13
Third
14
Fourth
15
Fifth
17
Sixth
16
Seventh
11
Eighth
11
Ninth
28
Tenth
12
Eleventh
12
Federal
12
28 USC §44ja). This understates the total numbers of judges, since scores of judges
on senior status continue to sit on three-judge panels as well. See Judith A. McKenna,
Structural and Other Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals 38-39 (Federal
Judicial Center, 1993) ("McKenna, Structural and Other Alternatives").
s The history and development of the en banc process is considered at greater
length in Christopher P. Banks, Judicial Politics in the D.C. Circuit 91-96 (Johns
Hopkins U, 1999) ("Banks, D.C. Circuit"); Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision to Grant En Banc Review, 74 Wash L Rev 213, 220-32
(1999); Michael Ashley Stein, Uniformity in the Federal Courts: A Proposalfor Increasing the Use of En Banc Appellate Review, 54 U Pitt L Rev 805, 808-19 (1993).
The Congressional statute is 28 USC § 46.
16 Figure 1 reflects the raw number of all en banc decisions, including those following oral argument and those following submission on the briefs. For the period from
1941 through 1964, the numbers are those presented in A. Lamar Alexander, Jr., Note,
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the Administrative Office of the United States Courts ('AO") for the
post-1964 period, and therefore requires a caveat. 7 The AO simply
reports the numbers submitted by circuits, and the meaning of these
numbers appears to vary by circuit. For example, some circuits appear
to report cases, while others report decisions. The practice appears
to vary by circuit and by year as court personnel changes. Despite
these variations, the data, which is relied upon by many scholars
and reporters, is sufficient to indicate a general trend. While the
number of en banc decisions has been steadily increasing, Figure 2
helps keep that number in perspective by comparing it with the total
number of decisions, which also has increased. The relative number
of en banc decisions has declined slightly since 1974, the first year
for which relevant data is available.1 8
En Banc Hearings in the Federal Courts of Appeals: Accommodating Institutional
Responsibilities (Part I), 40 NYU L Rev 563 & Part II 726, Appendix VI (1965). For
1966 through 1999, the numbers are those reported in the Annual Reports of the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (Table 7 for 1975, 1977-78, 1981, 1984-85;
Table 9 for 1979-80, 1983; Table 8 for 1982; Table S-3 for 1986-1989; Table S-1 for
1990-1999). Raw numbers are reported in Appendix 1.
17 For example, our research disclosed that the number of en banc decisions issued
annually during the late 1990's was between 70 and 80, or roughly 20 fewer cases
each year than the number reported by the AO. See Arthur D. Hellman, Precedent,
Predictability,and Federal Appellate Structure, 60 U Pitt L Rev 1029, 1040 n 52
(1999) (also recognizing apparent discrepancies in AO en banc data). The variations
appear to be attributable to differences between circuits rather than a different definition of en banc than the one used here.
'8 Figure 2 draws on the same Administrative Office data used in Figure 1. The
numbers forming the basis of this figure are reported in Appendix 1. Because the AO
only began regularly reporting terminations on the merits separate from all termina-
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Why do circuit judges decide to rule on a case en banc? The formal legal standards provide only limited guidance. Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 35(a) states that en banc rehearings are "not
favored," but will be ordered when "necessary to secure or maintain
uniformity" in the circuit's decisions, or when the case "involves a
question of exceptional importance." 19 The Supreme Court has stated
that the en banc process should be used to resolve intracircuit conflicts and to examine particularly significant disputes. 20 Cases and
scholarly literature give some content to these highly discretionary
tions in the term ending in 1974, we present the percentages beginning with that
term. We use merits terminations rather than dismissals for any reason, such as
settlement, because this provides a more meaningful comparison. To put the raw
numbers in perspective for the earlier period, Appendix 1 reports the frequency of en
banc decisions as a percentage of all terminations.
19Fed R App P 35 was first promulgated in 1967, and has been little changed
since then. The rule was amended in 1998 to clarify that an issue of "exceptional
importance" could include when a three-judge panel decision "conflicts with the
authoritative decisions of other United States Courts of Appeals that have addressed
the issue." Fed R App P 35(b)(1)(B).
20See, for example, Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner,314 US 326, 334-35
(1941) (Douglas, authoring unanimous opinion) (sanctioning for the first time en banc
practice in part because "[clonflicts within a circuit will be avoided"); Western Pac.
R. R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R. R. Co., 345 US 247, 270-71 (1953) (Frankfurter, concurring) (explaining that the en banc procedure was recognized by the Court to allow
courts of appeals to resolve intracircuit conflicts and to consider cases "extraordinary
in scale"); United States v. American-Foreign Steamship Corp., 363 US 685, 689
(1960) (observing that "[eln banc courts are the exception, not the rule" and should
be "convened only when extraordinary circumstances exist that call for authoritative
consideration and decision by those charged with the administration and development of the law of the circuit").
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criteria. 2' A question of "exceptional importance" can involve an
issue that frequently arises in or is otherwise highly relevant to the
bar in that particular circuit. 22 Likewise, a panel ruling that is in
direct conflict with the ruling of another appeals court may be a
highly important case because of the hazards posed by circuit splits,
which may prompt Supreme Court review.2 But, en banc opinions,
like Supreme Court opinions, only rarely explain why review was
granted. 24
Systematic examinations of en banc cases have found that the
decision to grant en banc review can be explained by looking beyond
the FRAP.25 Scholars have hypothesized that political rather than
legal reasons accounted for en banc practice, arguing, for example,
that circuits staffed by Reagan appointees were using the en banc
process mainly to overturn panel decisions by more liberal judges
appointed by Democratic presidents. The studies found some support for the politicization thesis, both among all of the circuits2 6 and
21

For summaries and analysis of the case law and literature, see Charles Alan

Wright, Arthur R. Miller and Edward H. Cooper, 16A FederalPractice and Procedure
§ 3981.1 (West, 3d ed 1999); Michael E. Solimine, Ideology and En Banc Review, 67
NC L Rev 29, 54-56 (1988). The mere fact that a majority of a circuit's judges favor a
full court hearing may be sufficient justification. But this position has been criticized
as undermining the normal appellate process since any case may be subject to en
banc review, even when litigants did not request it. Solimine, 67 NC L Rev at 48-50
(cited in note 21). On the other hand, en bane review permits the majority of judges
on a circuit to monitor the law announced by the court and thereby increase certainty
and predictability. See, for example, Stein, 54 U Pitt L Rev at 823-28 (cited in note 15).
22 See Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts:Challenge and Reform 381 (Harvard
U, 1996) ("Posner, Federal Courts") (discussing the idea that one circuit only should
disagree with the earlier holding of another circuit through the en banc process);
Solimine, 67 NC L Rev at 56-60 (cited in note 21) (giving examples).
23 See, for example, George, 74 Wash L Rev at 236 and notes 120-123 (cited in note
15) (discussing opinions, scholarship, and local circuit court rules suggesting that a
circuit split should result in en banc rehearing).
24 See Solimine, 67 NC L Rev at 65 (Table 4) and 70 (Table 6) (cited in note 21)
(reporting that only 29% of all en banc opinions issued in 1985, 1986, and 1987 indicated why en banc review was appropriate).
2 Both of the authors of the present article separately have reached this conclusion. One study of all en banc cases rendered in 1985, 1986 and 1987 concluded that
less than half of the cases seemed appropriate for en banc treatment, applying the
formal criteria in Fed R App P 35. Solimine, 67 NC L Rev at 63-70 (cited in note 21).
The other study examined all of the en banc cases in the 2d, 4th and 8th Circuits
from 1956 to 1996, and concluded inter alia that the formal criteria of the presence
of an intracircuit or intercircuit conflict did not play a statistically significant role in
explaining why a circuit went en banc. George, 74 Wash L Rev at 253-255 (cited in
note 15).
26 An initial study, by one of the authors of the present article, suggested the politicization thesis was overstated, in part because relatively few en bane cases showed
strict ideological voting. Solimine, 67 NC L Rev at 62-64 (cited in note 21). Other
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in particular circuits.27 One recent empirical study found that the
cases circuit courts selected for en banc review could be distinguished by the presence of a dissenting panelist, the reversal of a
2s
lower court or agency, and a liberal decision.
Apart from circuit judges' reasons for granting en banc review,
commentators do not agree on the appropriate institutional role of
the en banc procedure. Some argue that en banc decisions consume
too much time and too many resources, and undermine the finality
of judicial rulings. 29 Other scholars counter that the en banc process
increases intracircuit uniformity and reduces the impact of nonrepresentative three-judge panels. 30 Moreover, it has been argued that
increased en banc review could lessen intercircuit conflicts and otherwise reduce the need for Supreme Court review, which is significant given increasing circuit court caseloads and the Court's de3
creasing inclination to review. 1
C. The Intersection of the Certiorari and En Banc Processes
The last observation brings us to the focal point of this article.
Phrased simply, in exercising its review, does the Supreme Court
give any weight to the fact that the case below was decided en banc?
In other words, is certiorari more likely to be sought by litigants and
granted by the Court in en banc than in panel decisions?
The answer is not obvious from the standards the courts apply.
and later studies, covering more en banc cases over longer periods of time, found
considerable support for the politicization thesis among the circuits as a whole. See,
for example, Christopher E. Smith, Polarizationand Change in the Federal Courts:
En Banc Decisions in the U.S. Court of Appeals, 74 Judicature 133 (1990); Note, The
Politics of En Banc Review, 102 Harv L Rev 864 (1989).
27 For studies of particular circuits, see Banks, D.C. Circuit, at 96-107 (discussing
D.C. Circuit) (cited in note 15); J. Robert Brown, Jr. and Allison Herren Lee, Neutral
Assignment of Judges at the Court of Appeals, 78 Tex L Rev 1037, 1111-16 (2000)
(discussing 4th Circuit); George, 74 Wash L Rev at 250-70 (discussing 2d, 4th and 8th
Circuits) (cited in note 15); Phil Zarone, Agenda Setting in the Courts of Appeals:
The Effect of Ideology on En Banc Rehearings, 2 J App Prac & Proc 157 (2000) (discussing 4th and 5th Circuits).
28 George, 74 Wash L Rev at 268-69 (cited in note 15).
29 See Thomas E. Baker, Rationing Justice on Appeal: The Problems of the U.S.
Courts of Appeals 156-57 (West, 1994); Posner, Federal Courts, at 134-37 (cited in
note 22); Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and Jurisprudence: The Theory and Practice of Precedentin the Large Appellate Court, 56 U Chi L Rev 541, 546-50 (1989); Arthur D. Hellman, Breaking the Banc: The Common-Law Process in the Large Appellate Court, 23 Ariz St L J 915, 985 (1991).
30 See Stein, 54 U Pitt L Rev at 819-27 (cited in note 15).
"' Stein, 54 U Pitt L Rev at 827-29 (cited in note 15). See also McKenna, Structural
and Other Alternatives, at 67-71 (cited in note 14) (discussing various ways in which
en banc review by the circuits might enhance national uniformity in the absence of
Supreme Court review).
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The formal criteria for review at both levels might suggest that en
banc cases are more likely to be reviewed by the Court. Only "important" cases are supposed to be reviewed en banc, and only "important" cases are supposed to be granted certiorari. But "importance"
may mean different things in the different contexts. An en banc case
may be convened to resolve an intracircuit split or to address a subject of frequent litigation in the particular circuit, factors that presumably mean little to the Supreme Court. 32 Nor is principal-agent
theory especially illuminating. That all of the judges on a circuit are
deciding a case might suggest that they are less likely to diverge
from Supreme Court doctrine (perhaps because they expect that the
Court will be more likely to learn of any divergence). 33 But if an en
banc case carries greater precedential weight, 31 any doctrinal divergence may matter more, creating greater incentive for circuit judges
to follow their own preferences rather than Court precedent and also
causing the Court to look harder at en banc cases.
The appropriate role of en banc review is also unclear. Some circuit court judges have openly stated that they did not vote to hear a
case en banc because the Supreme Court was likely to hear an appeal of the three-judge panel anyway and therefore en banc review
would be unnecessary.35 Justices' opinions, however, have questioned
the lower court's failure to hear the case en banc, perhaps suggesting
that Supreme Court review would have been unnecessary had the
case been heard en banc. 36 Moreover, fewer resources are required
for rehearing en banc by the circuit than for petition and hearing by
37
the Supreme Court.
32

The Supreme Court has indicated that circuit courts are responsible for resolv-

ing internal conflicts. Wisniewski v. United States, 353 US 901, 902 (1957).
33 See Cross, 48 Duke L J at 563-64 (cited in note 12).
31See Solimine, 67 NC L Rev at 65 n 191 (cited in note 21) (addressing how citation analysis might be used to gauge the precedential value of en banc cases).
31 See, for example, Eisen v Carlisle& Jacquelin,479 F2d 1005, 1021 (2d Cir 1973)
(Kaufman, concurring in denial of rehearing en banc, and Mansfield, concurring in
denial of rehearing en banc), vacated and remanded, 417 US 156 (1974). For discussion
and additional examples, see Solimine, 67 NC L Rev at 57 (cited in note 21); Stein,
54 U Pitt L Rev at 822-29 (cited in note 15); Stephen L. Washy, The Ninth Circuit and
the Supreme Court: Relations Between Higher and Lower Courts 35 (1998) ("Washy,
Ninth Circuit") (paper delivered at 1998 annual meeting of the American Political
Science Association) (copy on file with Tracey George).
36 See, for example, Pounders v Watson, 521 US 982, 991 (1997); United States v
Watts, 519 US 148, 170 (1997) (Kennedy, dissenting). For discussion and additional
examples in both court opinions and out-of-court statements, see Stephen L. Washy,
The Supreme Court and Court of Appeals En Banc 7-9 (2000) ("Washy, Supreme
Court") (paper delivered at 2000 annual meeting of the American Political Science
Association) (copy on file with Tracey George).
" See Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J
Legal Stud 379, 401-03, 422-23 (1995) (questioning the relative value of another level
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Until very recently, the literature on the en banc and certiorari
processes said little about the possible importance of en banc review
to the certiorari decision. 3s Beginning in the late 1980s research finally began to focus on the issue, and did indeed show, for example,
that certiorari was sought and granted at a higher rate for en banc
4
40
cases.3 9 In the late 1990s, studies of the Ninth and D.C. Circuits, 1
as well as samples drawn from all circuits, 42 also found that the Supreme Court disproportionately reviewed en banc cases. The most
recent study found that, while the Court was more likely to review
en banc cases generally, the Court was less likely to grant certiorari
43
to cases from circuits with higher rates of en banc review.
Although these studies enrich our understanding of the interaction between the en banc and certiorari processes, more can be done.
For example, these studies focused on en banc cases reviewed by the
of appeal due to the low probability that a second appellate court would discover
previously unrecognized error and the costs of a second court's participation).
31 See, for example, Estreicher and Sexton, Redefining the Supreme Court's Role,
at 124-25, 190 n 12 (cited in note 4) (briefly discussing use of en banc decisions to
create national law and to lessen review by Supreme Court); Perry, Deciding to Decide, at 250 (cited in note 8) (mentioning a Supreme Court law clerk's views that
erroneous decisions below might not be reviewed because the circuit eventually
could correct the error through the en banc process).
39See Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 58 Ohio St L J 1635, 1676-77, 1692-94 (1998) (evaluating en banc
and non-en banc Fourth Circuit cases from 1962 through 1996); Solimine, 67 NC L
Rev at 69 n 204 (cited in note 21) (evaluating all en banc cases from 1985 through
1987).
40Marybeth Herald and Stephen Washy, motivated partly by Supreme Court reversal of three Ninth Circuit en banc cases during one term, independently examined
the Ninth Circuit's en banc decisions. The three cases were: California v Roy, 519
US 2 (1996), Arizonans for Official English v Arizona, 520 US 43 (1997), and Washington v Glucksberg, 521 US 702 (1997). The studies are Marybeth Herald, Reversed,
Vacated, and Split: The Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit, and the Congress, 77 Or
L Rev 405, 411, 476-77 (1998); Wasby, Ninth Circuit at 24-31 (cited in note 35).
41See Banks, D.C. Circuit, at 107-15 (cited in note 15) (discussing Supreme Court
review of en banc, and non-en banc, cases from the DC Circuit in the 1980s and
1990s). Banks' data on DC Circuit en banc decisions is from an earlier study, Douglas
H. Ginsburg and Donald Falk, The Court En Banc: 1981-1990, 59 Geo Wash L Rev
1008 (1991).
42 Stefanie Lindquist, Susan Haire and Donald R. Songer, Supreme Court Monitoring of the Federal Circuit Courts: An InstitutionalPerspective, 14-25 (2000) ("Lindquist et al, Supreme Court Monitoring")(paper delivered at 2000 Annual Meeting of
the American Political Science Association) (copy on file with Tracey George); Wasby
Supreme Court at 11-24 (cited in note 36) (reporting that 8.3% of the circuit cases
reviewed by the Supreme Court were en banc for the 1979 through 1988 terms and
6.4% were en banc for the 1989 through 1998 terms, and giving examples of when
the Supreme Court discusses the en banc nature of the case below in its opinion).
43Lindquist et al, Supreme Court Monitoring at 19, 25 (cited in note 42).
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Supreme Court, rather than examining all en banc cases in which
certiorari petitions were filed. Examination of all petitions from en
banc cases, including those that fail, is necessary to determine the
characteristics other than en banc status that are most likely to lead
to Supreme Court review.44 Also, several of these studies used the
aggregate data on en banc decisions in each circuit and year prepared
by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, which has
shortcomings. 4- More substantively, the studies have only begun to

disaggregate the factors that may lead the Supreme Court to review
a case other than the presence or absence of the en banc factor. The
remainder of the article seeks to fill some of these gaps.
III. EN BANC CASES AND SUPREME COURT
CERTIORARI: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
We study the relationship between en banc review and Supreme
Court certiorari during the Rehnquist Court from October Term
1986 through October Term 1998. We focused on the Rehnquist
Court for theoretical as well as methodological reasons. The Rehnquist Court has reviewed far fewer lower court rulings than its predecessors, prompting various competing explanations from different quarters. We want to contribute to this debate by considering
whether the Rehnquist Court is responding to the same cues that
influenced agenda-setting on earlier Courts. Our results can be compared to earlier studies of different Courts to evaluate whether the
Rehnquist Court is granting cert to fewer cases as a general rule or
for systematic reasons. Focusing on the Rehnquist era also provides
a methodological advantage by controlling the variables that otherwise might affect certiorari rulings. In particular, the Court's conservative ideological majority and the Chief Justice's influence on
agenda-setting were constant during the entire period.
To begin our study, we located all en banc cases decided during
this period 46 and reviewed the subsequent history of each to determine whether a certiorari petition was filed and, if so, how the peti" See Washy, Supreme Court at 1 (cited in note 36) (observing that it is helpful to
examine how frequently the Court grants review of cases decided en banc).
" See, for example, Lindquist et al, Supreme Court Monitoring (cited in note 42).
46 We built a list of en banc decisions during this period in several ways. We began
by running a WESTLAW search of all courts of appeals rulings from 1986 through
1999. We looked for the word "banc" in the syllabi of those cases, and then reviewed
each case to determine whether it was in fact an en banc decision. To look for the
word in the text would have yielded far too many hits. The problem with just focusing
on the syllabi, however, is that not all of the syllabi of en banc cases state that the
case is en banc. See, for example, United States v Banuelos-Rodriguez, 215 F3d 969
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tion was treated. We compared our findings about en banc cases in
the certiorari process with reported findings for all certiorari petitions filed with the Rehnquist Court as set forth in Table 1.
As reflected in Table 1 and illustrated by Figure 3, losing parties
in en banc cases are more than five times as likely as losing parties
in panel decisions to file certiorari petitions. Moreover, as illustrated
in Figure 4, the Rehnquist Court has been four times more likely to
grant a hearing to parties who lost after the full circuit court considered their cases than to those who lost after a three-judge panel did so.
These relative frequencies make it important to determine whether
the en banc nature of the lower court ruling prompts the Court to
grant certiorari or the same case characteristics that prompted the
circuit court to hear the dispute en banc also prompt the Supreme
Court to grant certiorari.
IV. TESTING A MODEL OF SUPREME COURT
CERTIORARI GRANTS
A. The Variables
Studies of the Supreme Court's agenda-setting process have demonstrated the theoretical and statistical significance of several case and
litigant characteristics that are independent variables in our model.
The dependent variable is the Court's decision to grant certiorari
(Granti), coded 1 if the Court granted certiorari, and 0 otherwise.
1. Case Characteristics
The Supreme Court's certiorari decision relates to the ideological
direction of the circuit court's decision, the existence of an intercircuit conflict on an issue presented by the case, the presence of a
dissenting panelist below, and whether the circuit court reversed the
lower court or agency. We add to these variables the fact that the
circuit court decided the case below en banc (EB), coded 1 if the case
was en banc, 0 otherwise.
We expect that the Court is more likely to grant certiorari to
(9th Cir 2000) {en banc) We supplemented this list by adding citations of en banc
cases discussed in published research on en banc decisionmaking, including our own
empirical work examining en banc rulings that constructed lists of en banc rulings.
Because the WESTLAW search found only about 80 percent of the second group of
cases, we probably failed to find every en banc case. We believe that any missed cases
are random (that is, they do not share relevant characteristics) based on our review of
cases that the WESTLAW search failed to uncover. To obtain a complete list of en
banc cases listed by case citation, contact Tracey George.
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Table 1. A Comparison of Certiorari Petition Filing Rates and Grant Rates for En
Banc Cases and All Circuit Cases: Rehnquist Court
Percentage of Cases in
which Cert Petitions
were Filed

Percentage of Cases in
which Filed Petitions
were Granted

Year

En Banc
Cases4 7

All Cases4 8

En Banc
Cases49

All Cases

1986

59.65%

14.00%

38.71%

5.97%

1987

59.38%

13.93%

32.26%

6.09%

1988

62.50%

13.49%

17.95%

5.03%

1989

43.55%

12.50%

20.83%

4.26%

1990

48.28%

11.19%

25.93%

4.85%

1991

56.14%

10.79%

12.50%

4.20%

1992

57.38%

10.06%

6.06%

3.40%

1993

47.62%

9.48%

5.00%

3.19%

1994

54.17%

9.24%

11.54%

3.30%

1995

69.23%

8.86%

20.00%

3.74%

1996

54.41%

8.05%

22.58%

3.36%

1997

64.38%

8.15%

15.22%

3.56%

1998

62.30%

8.25%

17.65%

3.50%

1986-98

56.00%

10.31%

18.37%

4.22%

47 These percentages are based on our research on the subsequent procedural history of the en banc cases in the list we constructed.
41 These percentages reflect the number of certiorari petitions filed in the Supreme

Court's appellate docket, not including in forma pauperis petitions, as a percentage
of all merits decisions by all circuit courts. The Supreme Court 1986-1995 terms are
drawn from Lee Epstein et al, The Supreme Court Compendium (CQ Press, 2d ed
1996) ("Epstein et al, Compendium") and the 1996-1998 terms are drawn from Harvard Law Review's annual Supreme Court issue. The number of circuit court merit
decisions is taken from the annual report of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts. The frequencies of certiorari filings and certiorari grants for en banc
cases as compared to all cases are reported in Appendix 2.
'9 We exclude cases in which the Supreme Court granted certiorari and summarily
vacated and remanded the en banc decision. We reason that such summary grants are
different from grants in order to review a case on its merits, so that different factors
may account for the Court's certiorari decision. The Supreme Court summarily vacated 2.85% of all en banc cases during this period (24 out of 841 cases), representing
5.10% of all en banc cases in which certiorari petitions were filed (24 out of 471).
The percentage in this column reflects the number of petitions granted full review as
a percentage of all petitions excluding summarily granted and dismissed petitions.
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lower court decisions that are ideologically inconsistent with the
Court's current majority, and that it is more likely to grant certiorari
to reverse than to affirm the lower court . 0 Because only four justices
50 See, for example, Virginia Armstrong and Charles A. Johnson, CertiorariDecision Making by the Warren and Burger Courts:Is Cue Theory Time Bound?, 15 Polity
141, 149 (1982) (finding that the Burger Court was more likely to grant certiorari to
liberal appeals court rulings in civil liberties and economic liberties cases and the
Warren Court was more likely to grant certiorari in conservative economic liberties
cases but not in conservative civil liberties disputes); Robert L. Boucher, Jr., and Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Justices as Strategic Decision Makers: Aggressive
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are required to issue a writ, a liberal minority could obtain review
of a conservative circuit ruling. We assume, however, that liberal
justices will behave strategically, refusing to vote for review of a conservative decision if the majority is likely to affirm and thereby to
strengthen the disfavored lower court position.5' Since the Rehnquist
Court has been dominated consistently by a conservative majority,
we hypothesize that the Rehnquist Court is more likely to grant certiorari to liberal circuit court decisions. Thus, we include a decision
ideology variable (I) coded 1 if the circuit decision was liberal, and 0 if
it was conservative.5 2 The ideological variable, derived from categories
used in the Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals Data Bases, reflects whether the court supports or opposes the issue to which the
case pertains. In criminal, civil rights, first amendment, due process,
privacy, and school desegregation cases, a decision is classified as
liberal if it was pro-criminal defendant, pro-civil liberties or civil
rights claimant, pro-indigent, pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, profemale in abortion (i.e., pro-choice), pro-underdog, anti-government
in non-takings due process, or pro-disclosure (except employment or
student records). For cases involving labor relations, economic regulation, or commercial activity, a decision is classified as liberal if it
was pro-union (except in union anti-trust suits), pro-competition,
anti-business, anti-employer, pro-liability, pro-injured person, prosmall business, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-environmental protection, pro-consumer, pro-accountability, or pro-trial in arbitration.
All cases in the sample were classified by ideological direction (that
is, they fell into a substantive category).
Aside from the ideological content of lower court rulings, justices
also seem to respond to the presence of an intercircuit conflict in
Grants and Defensive Denials on the Vinson Court, 57 J Pol 824 (1995) (examining
certiorari and merits votes of Vinson Court justices from 1946 through 1952 and
finding that justices who voted to reverse a lower court decision were significantly
more likely to have voted for certiorari than justices who voted to affirm); Saul Brenner and John E Krol, Strategies in CertiorariVoting on the United States Supreme
Court, 51 J Pol 828, 832-33 (1989) (concluding, based on a sample of cases from selected terms of the Vinson, Warren, and Burger Courts, that justices who voted in
favor of certiorari were more likely to vote to reverse than justices who opposed certiorari, termed an "error-correcting strategy").
s1 See id (reporting that justices in the majority were more likely to have voted for
certiorari than justices in the minority); Gregory A. Caldeira, John R. Wright and
Christopher J. W Zorn, Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in the Supreme
Court, 15 J L Econ & Org 549 (1999) (presenting substantial evidence that justices
voted against certiorari when their views on the issues presented as measured by
prior decisions were not supported by a Court majority).
52 For more discussion of the decision ideology variable, see George, 58 Ohio St L
J at 1673-75 (cited in note 39).
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the case (C).53 Studies have measured conflict by various means. We
classified a case as involving an intercircuit split only if any member
of the panel explicitly stated that another circuit or circuits had
reached a different decision in analogous circumstances and if the
conflict was express and direct rather than merely a matter of general or logical inconsistency.5 4 We coded cases containing such a
conflict as 1 and other cases as 0.
Principal-agent theory suggests that the Supreme Court will review a circuit court decision if it believes that the circuit violated
the terms of the relational contract among the courts. 5 Monitoring
the decisions of each circuit to learn if any three-judge or en banc
panels have breached the agency agreement is costly The Court will
be more likely to learn of breach when a circuit judge dissents because that judge has access to better information and an incentive
to set forth in an opinion reasons for Supreme Court review. Moreover, the mere fact of a dissent signals a problem with the case and
therefore that the Court may justifiably expend resources to review
the case or, at least, to look more closely at the petition for certiorari. 6 We coded cases with dissents (D) as 1, others as 0.
Studies also have found that a circuit court's reversal of a lower
court or agency's decision may signal the Supreme Court that the
case presents an issue demanding an authoritative review 5 7 We
13 See S. Sidney Ulmer, The Supreme Court's CertiorariDecisions: Conflict as a
Predictive Variable, 78 Am Pol Sci Rev 901 (1984) (concluding, based on a sample
drawn from the 1947-1976 terms, that "genuine" intercircuit conflict is statistically
significantly correlated with the Court's decision to grant review).
judges may disagree as to whether a conflict indeed has been created. See SoliJ4
mine, 67 NC L Rev at 40 n 53 (cited in note 21). To try to overcome this difficulty,
we adopted the basic standard set forth by Thomas Goldstein, who writes the
monthly Circuit Split Roundup for the Bureau of National Affairs: a case involves or
produces a split if it "acknowledge[s] and describe[s] disagreements." Thomas Goldstein, Circuit Split Roundup, 66 US L Week 2655 (April 28, 1998). In seeking to distinguish true intercircuit conflicts from merely superficial inconsistencies, we also
relied on the relevant insights from Arthur Hellman's test of whether conflict exists
between the same circuit's decisions, his "Theory of Intracircuit Conflict". Hellman,
23 Ariz St L J at 922-41 (cited in note 29).
s See Cameron, Segal, and Songer, 94 Am Pol Sci Rev 101 (cited in note 10).
56 See Patricia Wald, The D.C. Circuit:Here and Now, 55 Geo Wash L Rev 718,
719 (1987) (explaining that dissents are often considered by majority judges as signals
to the Supreme Court that the case is worthy of a grant of certiorari). See also Frank B.
Cross and Emerson H. Tiller, JudicialPartisanshipand Obedience to Legal Doctrine:
Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 Yale L J 2155, 2159 (1998)
(arguing that, under a sophisticated model of judicial behavior, circuit judges are most
likely to dissent when a panel reaches a decision that is contrary both to existing
Court precedent and to their preferences).
17 See Gregory A. Caldeira and John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda
Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 Am Pol Sci Rev 1109 (1988) (observing that
judicial clerks' memoranda on certiorari regularly note a circuit's reversal and pre-
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coded a petition filed from a circuit's reversal (R) as a 1 and a circuit's
affirmation as a 0.
2. Litigant Characteristics
Studies on the role of parties in the Supreme Court decision to grant
certiorari require adding three variables. First, we include in our
model whether the federal government (US) asked the Court to
grant certiorari (coded 1), or not (coded 0), s" based on research demonstrating that the Supreme Court is much more likely to grant petitions the Solicitor General has filed or has supported as an amicus.5 9 The Solicitor General wields significant influence with the
justices and has had tremendous success in both the petition and
merits phases of Supreme Court litigation. 60 That success is consistent with the SG office's careful screening and selection of cases in
which to seek Supreme Court review, long-standing relationship
with the justices, and experience in Court litigation. 61 We do not distinguish SGs under Reagan and Bush from those under Clinton because studies consistently have found that the SG was successful at
the certiorari phase (though not at the merits phase) regardless of
whether the President was of the same party or ideology as the
62
Court's majority.
senting systematic evidence that the Court is statistically significantly more likely
to grant certiorari when the appeals court reversed the lower court or agency).
11 We do not include in our analysis the few cases in which the federal government
filed briefs opposing certiorari. We might not expect briefs opposing certiorari to be
generally successful because the mere fact that a party invested resources to argue
against Court consideration may draw more attention to a case. The exception would
seem to be those cases in which the Court asks the Solicitor General for an opinion
on the appropriateness of certiorari. Because our sample included only one case in
which the SG gave a solicited opinion opposed to certiorari, we are unable to examine
this hypothesis.
19See Joseph Tanenhaus, Marvin Schick, Matthew Muraskin and Daniel Rosen,
The Supreme Court's CertiorariJurisdiction:Cue Theory, in Glendon Schubert, ed,
Judicial Decision-Making 111, 127 (Free Press, 1963); S. Sidney Ulmer, William Hintze and Louise Kirklosky, The Decision to Grantor Deny Certiorari:FurtherConsideration of Cue Theory, 6 L & Socy Rev 640 (1972).
60 See Lincoln Caplan, The Tenth Justice-The Solicitor General and the Rule of
Law (Alfred A. Knopf, 1987).
61 Doris Marie Provine, Case Selection in the United States Supreme Court 8692 (U Chicago, 1980) (describing the reasons for the Solicitor General's success as
a petitioner).
62 Certiorari studies generally define the federal government variable by the party
of the Court's majority rather than that of the President. See, for example, id at 8790 (reporting that the U.S. was successful as petitioner and as amicus supporting a
petition); Joseph Tanenhaus, Marvin Schick, Matthew Muraskin and Daniel Rosen,
The Supreme Court's CertiorariJurisdiction: Cue Theory, in S. Sidney Ulmer, ed,
Courts, Law and Judicial Processes 273 (Free Press, 1981) (examining certiorari deci-
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63
Second, amicus curiae may influence the certiorari process.
Amicus briefs often delineate reasons for granting review distinct
from those expressed by the petitioner. Moreover, the mere fact of
amicus participation indicates to the Court the relative importance
of the case and the impact of a Court decision on a broader spectrum
of society.64 Therefore, we hypothesize that amicus curiae support
for a writ increases the probability of a certiorari grant. We do not
include amicus curiae opposition in our model because the limited
evidence demonstrates that opposition actually increases slightly
the probability of Court review and the incidence of such opposition
was extremely rare in our sample, occurring in less than two percent
of the cases and in no cases without amicus support as well. We
recorded the presence of amicus curiae support for the petition for
certiorari based on a review of briefs filed with certiorari petitions.
The amicus curiae variable (AC) reflects whether parties other than
the federal government supported the petitioner's request (coded 1
if at least one brief was filed, and 0 otherwise).
Finally, repeat players (RP) are more successful in obtaining Supreme Court review. 6 Litigators and parties who repeatedly appear
in the high court will be better able to select cases in which to file
66
petitions and to draft petitions that draw the Court's attention.
The Court often sees the involvement of repeat players as a signal
that a case merits consideration. 61 We reviewed the briefs filed by
sions during the 1947-1958 terms and finding that the Democratic-appointeecontrolled Court was much more likely to grant certiorari to the federal government
under both Truman and Eisenhower); Ulmer, 78 Am Pol Sci Rev at 908 (cited in note
53) (reporting that federal government petitioner was a strong predictor of the Court's
certiorari decision from 1947 through 1976, a period during which the President and
the Court were at times in conflict).
See Gregory A. Caldeira and John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda
Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 Am Pol Sci Rev 1109 (1988) (finding that (1)
one amicus curiae brief favoring certiorari statistically significantly increases the likelihood of review; (2) the greater the number of amicus curiae briefs filed in support of
a certiorari petition the greater the likelihood of review; and (3) one or more amicus
curiae briefs opposing certiorari weakly but statistically significantly increases the
probability of review).
64 See Kevin T. McGuire and Gregory A. Caldeira, Lawyers, Organized Interests
and the Law of Obscenity: Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court, 87 Am Pol Sci Rev
717, 719 (1993); Gregory A. Caldeira and John R. Wright, The Discuss List: Organized
Interests and Agenda-Setting, 24 L & Socy Rev 807, 822 (1990).
61 See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 L & Socy Rev 95 (1974).
66 See Lee Epstein, Courts and Interest Groups, in John B. Gates and Charles A.
Johnson, eds, The American Courts:A CriticalAssessment 350-57 (CQ Press, 1991).
67 See, for example, McGuire and Caldeira, 87 Am Pol Sci Rev at 723 (cited in note
64) (finding, in a study of obscenity cases, a positive though statistically insignificant
relationship between state government petitioner and certiorari grants by the Burger
Court but no relationship during the Warren Court).
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petitioners and recorded whether the petitioning party or its counsel
or both were public interest law groups or state attorneys general. 68
If so, we coded the repeat player variable as 1, otherwise as 0.
We can now specify our model of Supreme Court certiorari decisions in the following terms:
Pr(Grant i = 1)= 3 + 3Ii +

2Ci

+ PD, +

4Ri

+ PsUS

+

06RPi

+

P3AC, + PsEBi.

We expect all of the independent variables to be positively related to
the dependent variable, the probability of granting certiorari (31, P2,
13, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138 > 0).
B. The Data
The sampling design involves stratification on both exogenous and
endogenous variables. We classified certiorari petitions from the
Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits into two subsets based on the
outcome variable of whether the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
We utilized this endogenous, or choice-based, sampling method because the dependent variable in our model is a rare event: a certiorari
denial is twenty-five times more likely than a grant.69 Hence, gen-

68 State attorneys general, like the U.S. Solicitor General, have the ability and
incentive to review which cases justify certiorari petitions and to invest the state's
limited resources in the cases that are most likely to gain the Court's attention. See
Christopher R. Drahozal, Preservingthe American Common Market: State and Local
Governments in the United States Supreme Court, 7 S Ct Econ Rev 233, 249-52
(1999) (positing that state attorney generals are motivated by concerns similar to
those facing the U.S. Solicitor General when making decisions about participation as
an amicus in Supreme Court litigation); Lee Epstein and Karen O'Connor, States and
the U.S. Supreme Court: An Examinationof Litigation Outcomes, 68 Soc Sci Q 660,
664 (1988) (finding that state governments with Supreme Court experience were very
successful in decisions on the merits); Thomas R. Morris, States Before the U.S. Supreme Court: State Attorneys General as Amicus Curiae, 70 Judicature 298, 300-01
(1987) (describing the efforts of state attorneys general to improve their performance
in the U.S. Supreme Court and in particular the work of the National Association of
Attorneys General to persuade states to adopt the successful strategies employed by
the Solicitor General).
69 This procedure is known as choice-based sampling in the social science literature and case-control sampling in the epidemiology literature, and is commonly used
in studies of Supreme Court certiorari decisions. See Charles F.Manski and Steven R.
Lerman, The Estimationof Choice Probabilitiesfrom Choice Based Samples, 45 Econometrica 1977 (1977) (proving that a population's parameters may be inferred from
the maximum likelihood estimators of a choice-based sample); Michael D. Green,
D. Mical Freedman and Leon Gordis, Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in Federal
Judicial Center, Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, 342, 343 (Matthew Bender,
2d ed 2000), available in Adobe Acrobat format at <http://air.fjc.gov/public/fjcweb.
nsf/pages/16> (visited on April 2, 2001) ("Green et al, Reference Guide") (explaining
case-control studies in epidemiology).
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eral random sampling would be insufficient to garner enough events
(granting of certiorari) for purposes of prediction. Therefore, we
sampled on the dependent variable, collecting a disproportionate
70
number of events.
We also selected petitions based on the exogenous en banc variable. We needed to sample cert petitions from en banc decisions at a
higher rate than those from panel rulings because of the low relative
occurrence of en banc hearing. Thus, our database consists of all
petitions from en banc decisions seeking a writ of certiorari to the
Second, Fourth, or Eighth Circuits and a random sample of petitions
from panel decisions in those circuits. Seventy-one petitions filed
from en banc decisions by these three circuits were either denied or
granted full consideration. We excluded petitions that were either
dismissed or treated summarily because the Court's ruling on those
petitions was prompted by factors that are irrelevant to our hypotheses, such as the parties' settlement of the underlying dispute or the
Court's contemporaneous holding in a similar dispute. The random
sample of petitions from panel rulings issued by these three circuits
contains 213 cases. In our logistic regression model, we weight the
cases to reflect the true proportion of petitions filed from panel decisions as compared to petitions filed from en banc rulings during
this period. 1
10Maximum likelihood estimation is effective when using choice-based sampling,
but the technique requires an appropriate adaptation of the equation. See Gary King
and Langche Zeng, Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data (forthcoming, Poli Analysis); Gary King and Langche Zeng, Explaining Rare Events in InternationalRelations Data (forthcoming, Intl Org) (Gary King's scholarship is available on his webpage at <http://gking.harvard.edu>) (visited on April 2, 2001); Charles E Manski and
Daniel McFadden, Alternative Estimators and Sample Designs for Discrete Choice
Analysis, in Charles E Manski and Daniel McFadden, eds, Structural Analysis of
Discrete Data With Econometric Applications (MIT Press, 1981) ("Manski and McFadden, StructuralAnalysis").
7 During the period of our study, petitions from en banc decisions accounted for
approximately 2% of all certiorari petitions. We oversampled the petitions from en
banc cases, so that they represent approximately 33% of the sample. As a result,
petitions from en banc decisions are overrepresented by .33/.02 = 16.5, and petitions
from panel decisions are underrepresented by .66/.98=.67. Thus, the en banc petitions must be weighted by .02/.33 = .06, and the panel petitions must be weighted by
.98/.66= 1.48. See, for example, the weighting technique recommended for using the
U.S. Courts of Appeals Data Base. The United States Courts of Appeals Data Base,
Documentationfor Phase I (ICPSR, 1996). See also Green et al, Reference Guide at
340-41 (cited in note 69) (explaining "cohort studies" in the study of disease which,
like our study, involve the selection of observations based on an exogenous variable);
Manski and Lerman, 45 Econometrica at 1985-87 (cited in note 69) (discussing the
methodological implications of a stratified choice-based sample as compared to a
random choice-based sample).
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Table 2. Case Characteristics: Independent Variables Based on Circuit Court's
Decision

Liberal
Intercircuit
Lower Ct.
Split

Reverse
Trial Ct.
or Agency

Circuit
Dissent

Total
Petitions

En Banc

Cert Granted
Cert Denied

7 38.9%
23 43.4%

6 33.3% 17 94.4% 10 55.6%
8 15.1% 52 98.1% 18 34.0%

18
53

Random
Sample

Cert Granted
CertDenied

47 61.0% 18 23.4% 21 27.3% 35 45.5%
38 27.9% 16 11.8% 27 19.9% 45 33.1%

77
136

Table 3.
Petition

Litigant Characteristics: Independent Variables Based on Certiorari

U.S.
Petitioner
or Amicus

Repeat
Player
Petitioner

Amicus
(non-U.S.)
Support

Total
Petitions

En Banc

Cert Granted
Cert Denied

5
0

27.8%
0.0%

8
16

44.4%
30.2%

3
1

16.7%
1.9%

18
53

Random
Sample

Cert Granted
Cert Denied

13
3

16.9%
2.2%

27
17

35.1%
12.5%

11
22

14.3%
16.2%

77
136

Tables 2 and 3 present relative frequencies for the independent
variables other than en banc. Of the four characteristics of the circuit court's decision, two are statistically significantly correlated
with the Supreme Court's decision to review panel decisions: the
ideological direction of the panel's ruling and the panel's recognition
of an intercircuit conflict.72 None of the variables appears to be statistically significantly related to the Court's decisions on petitions
73
from en banc rulings.
As set forth in Table 3, the Supreme Court has granted more petitions supported by the United States than those filed by other parties, although repeat players also have fared well in petitions from
11The Pearson's chi-square test results for the relationship between these variables
and the Court's certiorari decision in the random sample are: liberal court decision:
X2 =22.46, p<.0001; intercircuit split: X2 = 4 .9 4 , p<.05; circuit dissent: X2 = 1.55, N.S.;
and reverse: x2=3.21, p<.10.
73 The Pearsons chi-square test results for the significance of the relationship between these variables and the Court's certiorari decision in en banc cases are: liberal
2
2 2 82
2
court decision: X -. ll, N.S.; intercircuit split: X = . , p<.10; circuit dissent: X .66, N.S.; and reverse: X2= 2 .6 2 , p<.11.
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panel rulings 7 4 The low relative numbers make it difficult to infer
whether these variables alone were responsible for the Court's decision. However, multivariate controls will allow a consideration of
the possible contribution of the petitioner's identity to the Court's
cert ruling. Amicus support at the certiorari phase was unusual
(there was almost never opposition) and does not appear to have
been successful in support of petitions from panel rulings. 7s The
amicus and U.S. support numbers are too small in the en banc subset to support meaningful inferences.
The relative frequencies reveal some interesting possibilities, but
in isolation do not allow us to draw conclusions about any possible
causal relationship. The next step is to consider the influence of
each variable when controlling for the other hypothesized explanatory variables.
C. Multivariate Test of Supreme Court Review Model
We use logistic regression analysis to determine the relative influence of each particular variable on the Rehnquist Court's decision to
grant certiorari by subjecting the individual variables (i.e., the panel
characteristics) to multivariate controls. The resulting model's dependent variable is the probability that the Supreme Court would
grant certiorari, and its independent variables are the litigant and
case characteristics as well as the en banc treatment of the case. We
weighted the cases to accurately reflect the population. The results
are set forth in Table 4.
1. Non-En Banc Variables and Certiorari
Three case characteristics and two litigant characteristics statistically significantly increase the probability of the Supreme Court's
granting certiorari. A dissenting judge, the circuit's treatment of the
74 The Pearsons chi-square test results for the significance of the relationship between these two variables and the Courts certiorari decision in the random sample
are: U.S. supports: X2=15.24 p<.0001; and repeat player petitioner: X2 =15.27,
p<.0001. The Fishers Exact Test, used because more than 50% of the cells have values
below 5, for the relationship between U.S. support for a petition and the Courts decision in en banc cases is significant at the p<.0001 level. The three denials of certiorari
petitions supported by the SG were during Republican administrations.
11Our results are interesting when compared to recent findings that the rate of
amicus participation at the merits stage has been very high during the Rehnquist
Court era, though not necessarily successful in influencing the Court's reasoning or
judgments. See Joseph D. Kearney and Thomas W Merrill, The Influence of Amicus
CuriaeBriefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U Pa L Rev 743, 752-54, 789-93 (2000) (reporting that amicus briefs were filed in 85.10% of all Rehnquist Court cases (1986-95)
and the average number of briefs filed per case was 4.23).
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Logistic Regression Results
Parameter
Est.

Independent Variables
En Banc Decision (EB)
Ideological Direction of Circuit Decision (D)

Standard
Error

Sig (p < x)

1.30

.39

.001

.72

.25

.01

1.02

.29

.001

Dissenting Circuit Judge (D)

.31

.29

NS

Circuit Court Treatment of Lower Court (R)

.20

.24

NS

Federal Government Supports Petition (US)

2.64

.39

.0001

Repeat Player Petitioner (RP)

1.32

.26

.0001

Amicus Curiae (AC)

-. 26

.37

NS

Intercircuit Conflict (C)

-2 Log Likelihood = 726.1 (p < .0001)

lower court and the presence of an amicus brief are not statistically
significant, and the sign on the amicus curiae coefficient is negative.
Our study generally supports prior research demonstrating the
importance of litigant identity in Supreme Court agenda-setting.
The Solicitor General's participation as petitioner or amicus is the
single most influential characteristic of a petition: such a petition
is nearly five times more likely to be granted than a petition without
the SG's support.7 6 The odds that a repeat player petition would be
granted were three times higher than those for other petitions. However, other amicus participants did not have the anticipated positive
effect on the Supreme Court's decision to grant certiorari. 77 Characteristics of the circuit court decision also influenced the Rehnquist
Court's certiorari decisions. Circuit decisions citing intercircuit conflict, and those reaching a liberal outcome, were more than twice as
likely to be granted certiorari than cases without these variables.
2. En Banc Variable and Certiorari
Finally, and most importantly for our current project, the en banc
nature of the decision below increased the probability that the
76 To understand how we calculated these probabilities, see Gary King, Michael

Tomz and Jason Wittenberg, Making the Most of StatisticalAnalyses: Improving Interpretationand Presentation,44 Am J Pol Sci 347 (2000) (explaining in detail how to
present statistical results in a meaningful way, including calculation of probability).
11Our results are consistent with recent research considering the relative importance of the Solicitor General, repeat players, and amicus curiae at the merits stage
of Supreme Court decisionmaking. See Kearney & Merrill, 148 U Pa L Rev 743 (cited
in note 75).
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Rehnquist Court would grant certiorari. Petitions from en banc decisions were nearly three times as likely to be granted as compared
to petitions from panel decisions. The statistically significant relationship between the en banc variable and the Supreme Court's certiorari decision could mean that the en banc nature of the lower
court's decision itself increases the probably of Supreme Court review. On the other hand, that increased probability could be attributable to other variables, not included in our model, that also are
related to the en banc variable. We consider here to what extent
such non-en banc explanations, not included in our model, account
for the Court's decision to grant review.
One possible non-en banc explanation would focus on the quality
of the lawyers filing the petitions rather than on the parties deciding
to pursue Supreme Court review. Lawyers representing losing en
banc litigants may be better than lawyers representing losing panel
litigants. We would expect that lawyers who had persuaded the
court of appeals to grant rehearing en banc would be better able to
persuade the Supreme Court to grant certiorari. There is reason to
believe this hypothesis may be correct: certiorari petitioners who
had successfully obtained en banc review below were somewhat
more likely to win Supreme Court review than certiorari petitioners
who had opposed en banc reconsideration. However, the parties who
filed certiorari petitions from en banc losses were usually the ones
who had opposed rather than sought en banc review. Thus, the advantage of better lawyers should not systematically distinguish en
banc from panel cases.
Another explanation for the greater probability of en banc cases
being granted certiorari may be that courts of appeals grant en banc
review to the same types of cases that gain Supreme Court review.
But then it would still be necessary to explain why the Court is
more likely to grant certiorari in en banc cases than in panel cases
with similar characteristics. Previous work on the decision to grant
en banc review showed that nearly 90 percent of the decisions to
grant en banc review in the Second, Fourth, and Eighth circuits
could be attributed to a dissenting panelist, a panel reversing a trial
court or administrative agency decision, or a liberal panel outcome.7 8
Two-thirds of the panel rulings in our random sample had at least
one of these three factors, and certiorari petitions were much more
likely to be filed from panel rulings that had one of these characteristics than from other panel rulings.
In the end, we expect that the Supreme Court's certiorari decision
is affected by the en banc nature of the lower court ruling in two
78George, 74 Wash L Rev at 219-20 {cited in note 15).
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ways: en banc serves as a signal, and en banc cases are inherently
more significant. The Supreme Court can rely on the en banc nature
of the lower court's ruling as an easy-to-read signal that the case is
worthy of consideration because, for example, it presents salient or
complex legal questions. Moreover, a circuit court's en banc decisions are necessarily more important than panel decisions in terms
of their precedential and persuasive value.
V. CONCLUSION
Our study provides evidence for an intuition held by many who
study the federal courts, that the en banc nature of a decision is a
significant factor in the Supreme Court's decision to grant review.
The model controls for the variables previously demonstrated to affect the Court's agenda-setting behavior. Moreover, there is a theoretical basis for expecting the Court, when sorting through the thousands of certiorari petitions filed annually, to respond to the signal
sent by en banc resolution below.
Our findings add another piece to the puzzle of the interaction between the Supreme Court and the circuit courts. However, our work
also highlights questions that remain to be answered. For example,
if the Court is more attentive to en banc hearings, does it also respond to dissents from denials of rehearing en banc? When a full circuit votes not to rehear a case en banc, usually that is simply noted
without elaboration in the official reports. Occasionally, however,
79
one or more judges dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc.
Former D.C. Circuit Judge Patricia Wald has suggested that8 0 such
dissents are often "thinly disguised invitations to certiorari.
We found some empirical support for Wald's contention that dissents from en banc denial correlate with Supreme Court review. Solimine found in a study of the 1985-1987 terms that litigants sought
certiorari in 29 of the 58 cases where there were dissents from denial
of rehearing en banc (50 percent), and the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 11 (19 percent).8 ' In the present study, we found 142 cases
in which judges dissented from denial of rehearing en banc. Losing
parties sought Court review in 105 of those cases (74 percent), and
the Court granted review in 30 (21 percent). These percentages are
similar to those found for en banc cases as reported in Part III. These
71See Solimine, 67 NC L Rev at 64 (cited in note 21). Dissents usually are published separately and after the panel decision, though sometimes the dissents are
published at the same time as the panel opinion. See, for example, Lear v Cowan,
220 F3d 825 (7th Cir 2000).
80 Wald, 55 Geo Wash L Rev at 719 (cited in note 56).
11Solimine, 67 NC L Rev at 64-65 (cited in note 21).
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figures suggest that dissents do serve as a signal to the Supreme
Court. Additional evidence can be found in Supreme Court opinions
referring to such dissents8 2 and certiorari petitions relying on such
dissents.8 3 Further research is necessary to determine whether the
dissents are a statistically significant contribution to the Court's

higher probability of granting review to such cases.
Our results also provide further support for the recognized success of the Solicitor General before the Supreme Court as well as
the significant, though less frequent, success of repeat players. And
our finding that the conservative Rehnquist Court was much more
likely to review liberal circuit rulings is consistent with the attitudinal model and with the strategic account of high court agendasetting.

There are other avenues of possible further research. Most en
banc cases are presumably important, however one defines that
term, to the courts of appeals. But do those cases generate important

cases on the Supreme Court's docket? A casual review of the list of
those cases seems to indicate that several are indeed significant by

any measure. 4 But more rigorous and testable definitions of importance are necessary. 85 Moreover, Supreme Court cases that were en

banc below might be compared to en banc cases where certiorari
was denied or not sought at all, or to cases where there was a dissent
86
from denial of rehearing en banc.

82 For example, in the 1999 Term, the Court referred to such dissents in at least
four cases: United States v Locke, 529 US 89, 98-99 (2000); Board of Regents v Southworth, 529 US 217, 228-29 (2000); United States v Hubbell, 530 US 27, 34 (2000);
Miller v French, 530 US 327, 335 (2000). However, Washy, Supreme Court at 23-24
(cited in note 36) argues that circuit judges rarely dissent from en banc denials because the Supreme Court does not respond.
83 See, for example, Certiorari Petition in Brentwood Academy v Tennessee
Secondary School Athletic Ass'n, 121 S Ct 924 (2001).
84 See, for example, United States v Morrison, 529 US 598 (2000) (holding unconstitutional a provision of the Violence Against Women Act); Faragherv City of Boca
Raton, 524 US 775 (1998) (providing rules for employer liability in sexual harassment
cases); Teague v Lane, 489 US 288 (1989) (major habeas corpus case, generally limiting retroactive affect of newly announced constitutional rights); Communications
Workers v Beck, 487 US 735 (1988) (limiting unions' rights to spend dues for political
purposes). A full list of the en banc cases reviewed by the Supreme Court on the
merits is set forth in Appendix 3.
8 For example, the list of cases could be compared to the importance of cases as
measured by the attention of the media or other interested publics. See Lee Epstein
and Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience, 44 Am JPol Sci 66, 72 (2000).
86 For examples of the latter, see Coalition for Economic Equity v Wilson, 122 F3d
692 (9th Cir 1997) (dissent from denial of rehearing en banc), cert denied, 522 US 963
(1998) (upholding constitutionality of California's Proposition 209, restricting affirmative action); Hopwood v Texas, 84 F3d 720 (9th Cir 1996) (dissent from denial of
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Another avenue of research might concern whether the en banc
nature of the case suggests any different treatment in the Court's
resolution on the merits. For example, are such cases systematically
more or less likely to be affirmed?87 The rate of reversal in our
sample of Second, Fourth and Eighth circuit en banc cases is about
the same as the overall reversal rate reported for the Court, but a
systematic study would require controls for ideological direction
and other relevant variables. Exploring this question could shed
light on the assertion that the justices take into account different
considerations when deciding to grant certiorari than when deciding
the case on the merits. 8
More research also might be done on litigant behavior. Our data
indicate that litigants are more likely to file certiorari petitions in
en banc cases and in panel cases where there is a published dissent
from denial of rehearing en banc than from other panel rulings. This
suggests that litigants, or their attorneys, are aware of some factor
in these cases that is likely to trigger Supreme Court review. Yet
more work is necessary to model a theory of litigant behavior in this
context. To what extent does the en banc nature of the case interact
with other factors that influence litigants to file certiorari? Do attorneys emphasize the en banc status of the case in their briefing or at
oral argument?
We observed at the beginning of this article that, while the Supreme Court and the en banc courts of appeals produce relatively
few opinions annually, these are the most influential decisions issued by the federal judiciary. This study adds to our understanding
of these important rulings by illuminating the intersection of these
powerful institutions and the Supreme Court's efforts to monitor
the collective action of the courts of appeals, the next most important set of courts in the federal system.

rehearing en banc), cert denied, 518 US 1033 (1997) (holding unconstitutional University of Texas law school's affirmative action plan, and casting doubt on diversity rationale for such plans).
See Washy, Supreme Court (cited in note 36) (discussing this issue).
"For discussions of this distinction, see Perry, Deciding to Decide (cited in note
8); Baum, Case Selection (cited in note 8).
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Appendix 1. Annual Frequency and Relative Frequency of U.S. Courts of Appeals
En Banc Decisions

Year

En Banc
Decisions

As Percentage of
ALL Terminations

Year

En Banc
Decisions

As Percentage of
Merits Terminations

1947

9

0.3%

1974

102

1.2%

1948

9

0.3%

1975

69

0.8%

1949

18

0.7%

1976

63

0.7%

1950

17

0.6%

1977

65

0.7%

1951

19

0.5%

1978

64

0.7%

1952

10

0.3%

1979

52

0.6%

1953

11

0.4%

1980

65

0.6%

1954

13

0.4%

1981

69

0.6%

1955

16

0.4%

1982

74

0.6%

1956

16

0.4%

1983

66

0.5%

1957

23

0.6%

1984

106

0.7%

1958

18

0.5%

1985

85

0.5%

1959

30

0.8%

1986

90

0.5%

1960

26

0.7%

1987

88

0.5%

1961

20

0.5%

1988

117

0.6%

1962

29

0.7%

1989

99

0.5%

1963

41

0.8%

1990

85

0.4%

1964

38

0.7%

1991

89

0.4%

1965

49

0.7%

1992

84

0.4%

1966

45

0.5%

1993

78

0.3%

1967

38

0.5%

1994

106

0.4%

1968

39

0.4%

1995

96

0.4%

1969

38

0.6%

1996

107

0.4%

1970

65

0.4%

1997

80

0.3%

1971

51

0.1%

1998

83

0.3%

1972

20

0.2%

1999

94

0.4%

1973

23

0.4%
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Appendix 2. Certiorari Petitions Filed versus Petitions Granted Hearing and
Merits Consideration
En Banc Cases

All Cases

En Banc Cases

All Cases

Year

Filed

Granted

Filed

Granted

Year

Filed

Granted

Filed

Granted

1986

34

12

2547

152

1993

20

1

2442

78

1987

37

9

2577

157

1994

26

3

2515

83

1988

40

7

2587

130

1995

36

7

2460

92

1989

27

5

2416

103

1996

37

7

2200

74

1990

28

7

2351

114

1997

47

6

2106

75

1991

32

4

2451

103

1998

38

4

2056

72

1992

35

2

2441

83

Appendix 3.
Appeals

Rehnquist Court Decisions Reviewing En Banc U.S. Courts of

1986 term
US v Johnson, 481 US 681 (1987), rev'g 779 F2d 1492 (11th Cir 1986) (en banc).
Crawford Fitting Co. v J. T Gibbons, Inc., 482 US 437 (1987), aff'g & rem'g 790 F2d
1174 (5th Cir 1986) (en banc).
City of Houston, Tex. v Hill, 482 US 451 (1987), aff'g 789 F2d 1103 (5th Cir 1986)
(en banc).
Ricketts v Adamson, 483 US 1 (1987), rev'g 789 F2d 722 (9th Cir 1986) (en banc).
Welch v Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transp., 483 US 468 (1987), aff'g 780
F2d 1268 (5th Cir 1986) (en banc).
Greer v Miller, 483 US 756 (1987), rev'g 789 F2d 438 (7th Cir 1986) (en banc).
1987 term
Omni Capital Int'l v Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 US 97 (1987), aff'g 795 F2d 415 (5th
Cir 1986) (en banc).
Mullins Coal Co. v Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Pro., 484 US 135
(1987), rev'g 785 F2d 424 (4th Cir 1986) (en banc).
Carnegie Mellon Univ. v Cohill, 484 US 343 (1988), aff'g 1986 WL 192735 (3rd Cir
1986) (en banc).
United Sav. Ass'n of Texas v Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 US
365 (1988), aff'g 808 F2d 368 (5th Cir 1987) (en banc).
Haig v Bissonette, 485 US 264 (1988), aff'g 800 F2d 812 (8th Cir 1986) (en banc).
United States v Providence Journal Co., 485 US 693 (1988), dismissing 820 F2d
1354 (lst Cir 1987) (en banc).
Meyer v Grant, 486 US 414 (1988), aff'g 828 F2d 1446 (10th Cir 1987) (en banc).
Maynard v Cartwright,486 US 356 (1988), aff'g 822 F2d 1477 (10th Cir 1987) (en
banc).
Loeffier v Frank, 486 US 549 (1988), rev'g 806 F2d 817 (8th Cir 1986) (en banc).
West v Atkins, 487 US 42 (1988), rev'g 815 F2d 993 (4th Cir 1987) (en banc).
Frisby v Schultz, 487 US 474 (1988), aff'g 822 F2d 642 (7th Cir 1987) (en banc).
Communications Workers of America v Beck, 487 US 735 (1988), aff'g 800 F2d
1280 (4th Cir 1986) (enbanc).
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1988 term
Beech Aircraft Corp. v Rainey, 488 US 153 (1988), aff'g in part, rev'g in part 827 F2d
1498 (11 th Cir 19871 (en banc).
Perry v Leeke, 488 US 272 (1989), aff'g 832 F2d 837 (4th Cir 1987) (en banc).
Teague v Lane, 489 US 288 (1989), aff'g 820 F2d 832 (7th Cir 1987) (en banc).
Schmuck v United States, 489 US 705 (1989), aff'g 840 F2d 384 (7th Cir 1988) (en
banc).
Newman-Green, Inc. v Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 US 826 (1989), rev'g 854 F2d 916 (7th
Cir 1988) (en banc).
United States v Monsanto, 491 US 600 (1989), rev'g 852 F2d 1400 (2d Cir 1988) (en
banc).
Caplin & Drysdale v United States, 491 US 617 (1989), aff'g 837 F2d 637 (4th Cir
1988) fen banc).
Murray v Giarratano,492 US 1 (1989), rev'g 847 F2d 1118 (4th Cir 1988) (en banc).
1989 term
Zinermon v Burch, 494 US 113 (1990), aff'g 840 F2d 797 (11th Cir 1988) (en banc).
Perpich v Dept. of Defense, 496 US 334 (1990), aff'g 880 F2d 11 (8th Cir 1989) (en
banc).
Rutan v Republican Party of Illinois, 497 US 62 (1990), aff'g in part, rev'g in part
868 F2d 943 (7th Cir 1989) (en banc).
Hodgson v Minnesota, 497 US 417 (1990), aff'g 853 F2d 1452 (8th Cir 1980) (en
banc).
1990 term
InternationalUnion, United Auto., Aerospace and Agr. Implement Workers of
America, UAW v Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 US 187 (1991), rev'g 886 F2d 871 (7th
Cir 1989) (en banc).
InternationalOrganization of Masters, Mates and Pilots v Brown, 498 US 466
(1991), aff'g 889 F2d 58 (4th Cir 1989) (en banc).
E.E.O.C. v Arabian American Oil Co., 499 US 244 (1991), aff'g 892 F2d 1271 (5th
Cir 1990) (en banc).
Edmonson v Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 US 614 (1991), rev'g 895 F2d 218 (5th
Cir 1990) (en banc).
Renne v Geary, 501 US 312 (1991), vac'g 911 F2d 280 (9th Cir 1990) (en banc).
Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v Attorney General of Texas, 501 US 419 (1991), rev'g 914
F2d 620 (5th Cir 1990) (en banc).
Barnes v Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 US 560 (1991), rev'g 904 F2d 1081 (7th Cir 1990)
(en banc).
1991 term
Jacobson v United States, 503 US 540 (1992), rev'g 916 F2d 467 (8th Cir 1990) (en
banc).
Sawyer v Whitley, 505 US 333 (1992), aff'g 881 F2d 1273 (5th Cir 1989) (en banc).
Estate of Cowart v Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 US 469 (1992), aff'g 927 F2d 828 (5th
Cir 1991) (en banc).
United States v Fordice, 505 US 717 (1992), vac'g 914 F2d 676 (5th Cir 1990) (en
banc).
1992 term
Soldal v Cook County,Ill., 506 US 56 (1992), rev'g 942 F2d 1073 (7th Cir 1991) (en
banc).
Graham v Collins, 506 US 461 (1993), aff'g 950 F2d 1009 (5th Cir 1992) (en banc).
Building and Const. Trades Council of Metropolitan Dist. v Associated Builders
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and Contractorsof Massachusetts/RhodeIsland, Inc., 507 US 218 (1993), rev'g 935
F2d 345 (1st Cir 1991) (en bane).
Reno v Flores, 507 US 292 (1993), rev'g 942 F2d 1352 (9th Cir 1991) (en bane).
1993 term
United States v Irvine, 511 US 224 (1994), rev'g 981 F2d 991 (8th Cir 1992) (en
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